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NOTES
GROWER-CANNER AGREEMENTS: AN ABUSE OF MASS
STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS"
THE mass standardized contract is peculiarly fitted to the needs of the large
scale business enterprise.1 Production and distribution must inevitably follow
recurrent patterns if business is to function with ease and efficiency. By use
of a printing-press contract tailored to the particular needs of the business in
which it is used, many transactions can be cast into a neat mould. At one end
of the production process these contracts make it possible for a company to
simplify its procedure for procuring raw materials, and at the other end they
make possible the orderly disposal of the company's finished product.2
But since standardized contracts are usually drawn with the business re-
quirements of only the drafter in mind, they often impose a disproportionate
burden on the other party.3 The proffer of these contracts is necessarily on a
* Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F2d SO (3d Cir. 1949).
1. Only recently have Anglo-American legal scholars recognized that mass stand-
ardized contracts differ from those in which the parties have dickered over the contract
terms. For the only comprehensive study of these contracts see PnAuszrrz, Tim Szn,-
ADIZATIOT OF COaM=ERc1AL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAw (1937),
excellently reviewed by Professor Llewellyn in 52 HAnv. L. Rnv. 700 (1939). Studies
of the judicial treatment of mass standardized contracts in the United States have done
little more than suggest the problems involved. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, 43
COL. L. REv. 629 (1943); Llewllyn, What Price Contract?--.n Essay it Pcrspecthei,
40 YAiE L. J. 704 (1931) ; Isaacs, The Standardicing of Contracts, 27 Yu.%n L. J. 34
(1917).
2. See Professor Llewellyn's analysis of the advantages of standardized con-
tracts: "They save trouble in bargaining. They save time in bargaining. They infinitely
simplify the task of internal administration of a business unit, of keeping tabs on trans-
actions, of knowing where one is at, of arranging orderly expectation, orderly fulfill-
ment, orderly planning. They ease administration by concentrating the need for discre-
tion and decision in such personnel as can be trusted to be discreet. This reduces human
wear and tear, it cheapens administration, it serves the ultimate consumer." Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 701 (1939).
3. French and German legal writers have offered the most perceptive analyses of
this aspect of mass standardized contracts. Saleilles was the first to coin the phrase "con-
tracts of adhesion" which has since become a popular label for these contracts. See
SAix.Es, DE iA DfCLARATiON DE VOLONTL 229 (1901) ; 2 DL-0xoGv, TnAra D.S On-
LIGATIONS EN GENLRAL 307-37 (1923); RirERT, LA RMGLE MOrL t PANS XErS OrLiGA-
noxs Crvn s (2d ed. 1925); RAIsER, DA S Rrcn1T DF ALLGEivE, GE5scHis Brmnxu-
Nzz (1935) ; Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in Frcnch and Gcrmnan
Law, 11 TuLA-z L. REv. 345 (1937).
For a moral defense of standardized contracts, contrast the following statement by
Prausnitz: "In discussing the economic forces concerned, it is too often supposed that
they are guided by sheer avarice. This feeling is by no means correct in the majority of
cases. Often genuine and legitimate interests are sought to be protected. In the sale of
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take-it-or-leave-it basis, and quite often an individual vis-a-vis a large enter-
prise is in an economic squeeze which precludes him from shopping around
for better terms. And in many cases if he did look around he would find that
all competitors incorporate the same terms in their contracts.4 The quantity,
quality and price of the contracted item may be open for actual bargain. But
once the contract is assented to, the weaker party may well find that he has
accepted the risk of loss before delivery, has given a warranty or surrendered
his right to rely on a warranty, established the company as the sole judge of
quality, exempted it from liabilities resulting from such contingencies as
strikes, floods, fires and transportation difficulties, limited his own remedies in
case of default by the company, assented to a stiff liquidated damages provi-
sion, convenanted not to deal with the company's competitors, and, in some
cases, even assumed the risk of future price fluctuation.5
goods it is not only the struggle between manufacturers, importers and the ultimate
buyers of goods which contributes to the formation of individual clauses, but also the
nature of the goods and the character of the particular market." PRAUSNITZ, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 26-7.
Standaidized contracts are often used by parties with equal bargaining power. In
such a situation, however, there is a danger that each side will insist on the use of its
own form-and that the forms will be inconsistent. Professor Fuller has set out the
problem as follows: "Often the seller, instead of accepting the buyer's purchase order, or
returning the buyer's 'acknowledgement' form, sends the buyer his own form, called a
'sales order.' This will be like the buyer's 'purchase order,' and will itself be 'subject to'
certain terms or 'conditions' printed at the bottom or on the back. The chances that
these 'conditions' in the 'sales order' will coincide with those stipulated by the buyer are,
of course, negligible .... The result is that instead of an orderly negotiation of the terms
of the sale, we have the parties engaged in a battle of forms, each jockeying for position
and each attempting by whatever means he can to get the other to indicate assent to his
form .... It is easy to see from the above account that in commercial and industrial
purchasing transactions it will typically be difficult to determine (1) whether any con-
tract was formed, and if so, (2) when, and (3) on what terms." FuroR, BASIc CoN-
TRACT LAW 178-9 (1947). To minimize these conflicts, standard forms have been drafted
by trade associations representing buyers and sellers. For example, the National Associa-
tion of Purchasing Agents has worked out forms covering the sale of commodities such as
coal, fuel oil, scrap iron and steel. After a study of about 500 order forms used by retail
stores all over the United States, the National Retail Dry Goods Association is about to
publish a Standard Order Form. In the "grey goods" market (unfinished cloth as it comes
from the loom) the Worth Street Rules have standardized transactions. These rules have.
been adopted by thirteen trade associations, involving textile manufacturers, garment manu-
facturers, brokers, and purchasing agents. The rules incorporate a standard Salesnote,
technical specifications covering quality definitions and tolerances, arbitration rules, and
definitions of trade terms and customs. Id. at 178-81, 925.
4. See Kessler, supra note 1, at 632.
5. "Contracts of sale today are furnished on printed forms. All that is necessary is
to insert a description of the subject matter, the price and terms of payment, and procure
the buyer to sign. How often does the buyer know the extent of his obligations or the ex-
tremes to which the seller may resort to enforce his remedy? It is the seller whose in-
terests are safeguarded in the printed form he produces and asks the buyer to sign." V.
Valenti, Inc., v. Mascitti, 163 Misc. 287, 290, 295 N.Y. Supp. 330, 335 (1937).
The story of warranties in both sales and insurance law also provides a good illu-
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The oppressive clauses of mass standardized contracts, particularly those
which place the brunt of an adverse price fluctuation on the weaker party, have
given rise to much friction and litigation.0 In trying to relieve one party from
the rigors of the contract, courts have generally taken a schizoid approach:
they pay homage to the long accepted common law principles of contract, refus-
ing, on the surface, to recognize the economic realities of the transaction ;7 but
by the semi-covert and often tortuous technique of "interpretation" they usu-
ally manage to obtain a result which equalizes the position of the parties. The
technique may be used in many ways. The court may "construe" patently clear
language ;s it may find ambiguity (which must be construed against the propo-
nent of the contract) in unambiguous clauses ;9 or it may tussle with those
stration of how a large organization imposes a one-sided agreement on an individual or
on an unorganized group. For a description of the problem in the law of sales, see Bo-
gert & Fink, Bfsiwss Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 Ili L.
Rav. 400 (1930) ; Comment, 57 YAI.z L. J. 13S9, 1400 (194); Notes, 31 Co. L. REV.
1325 (1931), 23 IIrn. L. REv. 784 (1939). For warranties in insurance contracts, see
Patterson, Warranties in Insurance Law, 34 Co. L. RE:v. 595 (1934) ; Vance, The His-
tory of the Deielopment of the Warranty in Insurance Low, 20 Y.z L. J. 523 (1911).
6. An adverse price change is responsible for a preponderance of litigation. See
Havighurst and Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL L. RPv. 1 (1932);
Vold, The Tort Aspect of Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts, 41 HAnv. L. REV. 340
(1928). Excellent illustrations are found in Case Studies in Business, 2 HmAv. Bus. Rv.
238, 367, 496 (1924) (Harrison Steel Corporation, The Randolph Shoe and Leather
Company, The American Sugar Refining Company).
7. The verbalization has usually been in the form of obeisance to the ideal of "free-
dom of contract." See e.g., the famous dicta of Sir George Jessel: "... . [Ihf there is
one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their con-
tracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced
by Courts of justice. . . .You have this paramount public policy to consider-that you
are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract." Printing and Numerical
Register Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875). See Kessler, supra note 1, at
630-1.
Interpreting these words literally, some courts have remained unmoved by the equities
of the particular case and allowed the strong bargaining party to make the most of his
advantageous position. An oft-cited illustration is the case of Hollis Bros. & Co, Ltd., v.
White Sea Timber Trust, Ltd. [1936 K.B.] 3 All Eng. 895 (clause, "subject to seller's
maling necessary chartering arrangements," held to give seller an option to deliver or
not).
8. See, e.g., Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 33 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E.
327 (1928) (disclaimer of warranty held to apply only to e-xpress warranties, thus per-
mitting recovery on an implied warranty) ; Austin Co. v. Tillman Co., 104 Ore. 541, 209
Pac. 131 (1922) (clause limiting buyer's right to return goods was held applicable only
if the seller had delivered goods which reasonably met the contract description). For the
various ways in which courts interpret requirement and output contracts so as to avoid
placing the burden of a price fluctuation on the weaker party, see Havighurst & Berman,
supra note 6. For the way in which the burden is shifted from the weaker party in certain
banking transactions, see Note, Bank Stipulations to Avoid a Presumption of Purchase in
Collection Cases, 27 CoL. L. REV. 73 (1927).
9. See, e.g., Raw Silk Trading Co. v. Katz & Freed, 201 App.Div. 713, 194
1949] NOTES 1163
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ambivalent tools, the doctrines of mutuality'0 and consideration." If the suit
is in equity the court's labors will be much simpler, for it may readily resort to
the doctrine that "equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains."' 2
But courts also feel a counterbalancing pressure in some cases-particularly
those involving specific performance-to uphold mass standardized contracts.
In "construing" or refusing to enforce one contract, they are, in effect, tamper-
ing with all of them. If they sanction one breach, they are encouraging mass
breach.13 And when the production process of a large enterprise is dependent
N.Y.Supp. 638 (1922) (clause making credit subject to seller's discretion held not to
give seller right to refuse credit by demanding cash on delivery).
10. See, e.g., Weil v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 138 Ark. 534, 212 S.W. 313
(1919) (contract exempting seller from liability "for any loss of profits or damage for
its failure to deliver goods ordered, or for the cancellation of this agreement" held in-
valid for lack of mutuality); Schlegel v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N.Y. 459,
132 N.E. 148 (1921) (requirements contract held unenforceable for lack of mutuality
when buyer greatly increased his needs after price had taken sharp rise due to war).
11. See Notes, Species of Inadequacy of Consideration Which Havc Induced Judi-
cial Refuwsal to Attach Obligation to Promises, 27 Co. L. Rav. 178 (1927), In equality
of Bargaining Power as an Occasion for the Non-Enforcement of Bargains in which the
Consideration Is Inadequate, 27 COL. L. REv. 430 (1927).
12. See, e.g., Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1891) (plaintiff
'was denied specific performance of contract under which defendant was granted the use
of certain patents only on condition that he would not import, sell, or manufacture under
other patents or ever contest any patents claimed by plaintiff).
Conversely, when faced with contracts which have made commercial sense and been
commercially fair, several courts have found inapplicable the principle that a form con-
tract should be interpreted against the party who drafted it, See, e.g., Pottash v. Herman
Reach & Co., 272 Fed. 658 (3d Cir. 1921) (interpretation in seller's favor of clause for
forced acceptance of goods where parties obviously contracted with reference to war
conditions of overseas trade which made the clause reasonable) ; Hogue-Kellogg, Inc., v.
G. L. Webster Canning Co., 22 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1927) (despite Virginia statute which
provided that no printed form contract was binding unless the clauses for the vendor's
benefit were in type of described minimum size, the court enforced clauses which It
considered fair and reasonable even though they did not comply, since it felt that the policy
of the statute was that reasonable clauses were to be given effect),
13. "If it should be assumed as a fact that upon the breach of contracts of this nature
other tomatoes of like quality and quantity could be procured in the open market without
serious interference with economic arrangements of the plant, a court of equity would
hesitate to assume to interfere, but the very existence of such contracts proclaims their
necessity to the economic management of the factory .... The breach of the contract by
one planter differs but in degree from a breach by all." Curtice Brothers' Co. v. Catts,
72 N.J.Eq. 831, 833-4, 66 AtI. 935, 936 (1907) ; Heinz Bros. v. Currie, 83 N.Y.S.2d 705
(19.48)..
Courts have been especially strict in enforcing standard contracts between farmers
and farmer marketing cooperatives. "[Farmers] are associating themselves as authorized
by the statute, like other persons, and they have signed mutual and fair agreements
among themselves which will be futile unless those who have signed such agreements
can be held to abide by the terms of their contracts." Tobacco Growers Co-op v. Jones,
185 N.C. 265, 277, 117 S.E. 174, 180 (1923); Washington Cranberry Growers' Ass'n v.
Moore, 117 Wash. 439, 201 Pac. 773 (1921). For a compilation of these decisions, see
SUMMARY OF CASES AND DEcIsIONs ON LEGAL PHASES OF COOPERATION (U.S. Dept. of
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on the performance of a standardized contract, widespread harm may result
from a blind effort to protect the weaker bargaining party who is before the
court.14
A typical transaction utilizing a mass standardized contract is that in which
a canner, well in advance of the canning season, contracts to buy a farmer's
entire output of a particular crop.15 The canner is thus assured a source of
supply and the farmer a ready market. Theoretically, both receive insurance
against an adverse price change."" But since the market is usually composed
of a few large buyers and many small sellers, the canner almost invariably
attempts to bind the farmer while leaving as many loopholes as possible for
itself should subsequent market conditions make it empedient to get out of
the contract.' 7 In the recent case of Campbell Soup Company v. Wientz,'8
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that Campbell in
drafting its contracts with farmers had been too successful in this effort.
In June, 1947, Campbell entered into a contract with George and Harry
Wentz for the delivery of all the Chantenay red-cored carrots to be grown on
Ag., Bur. of Ag. Econ. 1924). For a discussion of the use of output contracts by co-
operatives, see Henderson, Cogperative Marketing Associations, 23 Co.. L. REv. 91
(1923).
Where the strong bargaining party is the buyer, courts in granting specific r--
formance have been influenced by the fact that contract breaches would cut dovwn access
to raw materials, making it difficult for the buyer to fulfill future contract commitments
for his finished products and leaving him open to a multiplicity of laxw suits. See Thomp-
son v. Winterbottom, 154 Md. 581, 583-4, 141 AtL. 343, 345 (1923); Friedberg v. Me-
Clary, 173 Ky. 579, 5S6, 191 S.W. 300, 303 (1917).
14. For a general discussion of judicial protection of contract expectations, see
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest ii Contract Damages, 46 YAX.n L. J. 52, 63
(1936).
15. See Comment, The Caner-Grower Contracts it Wisconsin, 1948 Wis. L. RLv.
415 (legal implications of farmer-canner contracts). For the problems involved in out-
put contracts generally, see Havighurst & Berman, supra note 6; Note, 28 CoL,. L. hm,.
784 (1928) ; 2 W.isrox, Suras § 464a (rev. ed. 1948).
16. But cf. NoiTox, AN Ecoxozmic STUDY OF TE PrODUCTIon- O CANN-ING Crops
ix Nv Yox 11 (1922): "There are advantages and disadvantages to the farmer in
this method of sale. He is sure of the price, but he is in no way certain of the total re-
turns he will receive. The profitable years, in the case of contract crops, are years v;hen
yields are good. When the yields of crops produced for the open market, such as cabbage
and potatoes, are high, low prices usually prevail, but in years of low yields there is
usually a compensating increase in the price. There is no such increase in the price of
contract crops when the yields are lo, and therefore such years are very unprofitable"
17. Two recent studies of canning contracts in Wisconsin indicate that canners con-
sistently insert clauses which make it possible for them either to totally avoid, or at least
to minimize, their contract liability if market conditions so dictate. See Knoss, Grov,n-
CANNER CORN, BEAN AND BEET Corm crs (U. of Wis. Ag. Exp. Sta. Bull. No. 42,
Jan. 1949) ; BLAcK & FROErm, GrowEm-CAxNER PrA Co.rnc's (U. of Wis. Ag. Exp.
Sta. Bull. No. 475, Oct. 1947).
For an analysis of agricultural marketing structures and marketing methods see
NIcHOLLs, IiiPEzas-c ComTrIoN WITHIN AGRICULTURAL% INDUsTIm-s (1941); Suur-
HERD, ,AREING FnAR PnoDucrs (1946).
18. 172 F2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949).
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fifteen acres of the Wentz farm during the 1947 season. This particular
variety of carrot is of special value to canners because it is of uniform color
throughout and has a shape which makes it easy to process. The price specified
in the contract ranged from $23 to $30 per ton according to the time of de-
livery. The Wentzes harvested approximately 100 tons of carrots, but by early
January, 1948, the contemplated time of delivery,' 9 the market price had risen
to over $90 per ton and Chantenay red-cored carrots were virtually unobtain-
able. The Wentzes told a Campbell representative that they would not deliver
at the contract price. Instead, they sold 62 tons of the carrots to a neighboring
farmer named Lojeski who in turn resold about 58 tons on the open market,
approximately half to Campbell and the balance to other purchasers. Since
the market had become tight, Campbell suspected that Lojeski was selling
"contract carrots." The conmpany immediately instituted suit against him and
the Wentz brothers to enjoin further sale of the contract carrots to others and
to compel specific performance of the contract. The trial court denied a mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds that Campbell failed to es-
tablish that the carrots were "unique goods" or that this particular variety of
carrot was indispensable to the continuation of its business.20 The Third Cir-
cuit upheld the result but on different grounds.2' It felt that the contract, a
form "quite obviously drawn by skillful draftsmen with the buyer's interest
in mind," was "too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to entitle
the plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience." 22
The court admitted that some of the contract stipulations were not unrea-
sonable when properly interpreted. For instance, although Campbell was made
the sole judge of conformance with specifications, there was no doubt that it
would be held liable if it refused carrots which were up to the required stand-
ard .3 Nevertheless, the court felt that the general tenor of the contract was
one-sided, as evidenced by provisions such as these: the carrots were to have
the stalks cut off and be in clean, sanitary bags approved by Campbell; Camp-
bell was allowed to refuse carrots in excess of twelve tons to the acre; the
farmer covenanted not to sell carrots to anyone else except for the carrots
19. There was no contention that this was not a fair price at the time the contract
was made. The price in canning contracts is customarily set on an open market and not
by the large canners alone. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from David
Rowntree, Manager, Genessee-Orleans Vegetable Growers Co-operative, dated March
30, 1949.
20. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 75 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
21. To prevent the issue of specific performance from becoming moot before an
appeal could be taken, the parties agreed that Campbell should receive all the carrots
held by the defendafits. In return, Campbell paid a stipulated market price of $90 per
ton, $30 to defendant Wentz and the balance into the registry of the district court pend-
ing the outcome of the appeal. 172 F.2d 80, 81 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1949).
22. Id. at 83.
23. Ibid. The court analogized this provision to a promise to perform to the
satisfaction of another, citing Griffin Mfg. Co. v. Boom Boiler & Welding Co., 90 F.2d
209 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 741 (1937) ; Lord Co. v. Industrial Dyeing &
Finishing Works, 252 Pa. 421, 97 Atl. 573 (1916).
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rejected by Campbell; he also covenanted that he would not permit anyone
else to grow carrots on his land; in case of breach, Campbell was to be en-
titled to liquidated damages fixed as $50 per acre-there was no provision for
liquidated damages in the event of breach by Campbell. "
In addition, there was one provision in the contract which the court asserted
went "too far." This relieved Campbell of the obligation to buy any carrots
which it was unable to receive or handle because of any labor disturbance or
"because of any circumstance beyond the control of Campbell."2 5 Presum-
ably this would have allowed Campbell to refuse carrots if there was a decline
in the demand for its soups and a resulting production curtailments 0 The
farmer's principal motive in entering this contract was security against a price
drop,2 but while the contract provided a good hedge for Campbell, the farmer
was left open to the very danger against which he sought to protect himself.P
The court, however, took pains to emphasize that Campbell's contract was
not "illegal."' ' Thus it undoubtedly meant to leave the way open for Campbell
to sue the Wentzes for damages for breach of contract. But Campbell vll
probably find this alternative highly unsatisfactory. In this particular contract,
the liquidated damages provision might backfire on Campbell by limiting the
measure of damages to $50 per acre or a total of $750," whereas the damage
24. Although canning contract terms vary considerably with the product involved,
the studies of pea, beet, corn, and bean contracts made in Wisconsin illustrate that the
Campbell contract, taken as a whole, was no more severe than most others. See Kr.oss
and BLACK & FRoR, supra note 17.
25. Compare the clause in many pea contracts which empowers the canner to alter
the purpose of the contract radically by refusing to take the green crop and insisting
that the grower deliver instead a fully ripened, dry crop at a greatly reduced price.
BI.Acx & FRozKE, supra note 17, at 27.
26. The organization of the canning industry makes a production curtailment a real
threat. "The vegetable canning industry appears to offer an excellent illustration of the
relationship between the nature of costs and stability of output. Plant and equipment
overhead represents a comparatively small part of the canner's cost. His main items of
expense are wages, cans, and raw materials, all of which are variable. This being the
case, he is almost certain to respond to falling prices with a sharp curtailment of out-
put-and this will be true under conditions of competition as vwell as under monopoly."
HoFFrAN, LARGE ScALE ORGANIZATION IN THE FOOD INDUsTmIEs 118-9 (TNEC Mono-
graph 35, 1940).
27. The defendants made an effort at the hearing to show that the farmer was co-
erced by Campbell to enter into carrot contracts. But the district court judge was of the
opinion that "the farmers in good faith thought that... if we can get a good honest
contract here to purchase our products ... we will feel a whole lot more secure. .. ,
Appendix to Appellant's Brief, p. 111a, Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F2d -9 (3d
Cir. 1949).
28. In most cases, curtailment of production by Campbell would stem from a de-
clining demand and lower prices for food products in general. Driven to the open market,
the farmer would have to take the burden of the price drop.
29. 172 F2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1949).
30. "If a provision is construed to be one for liquidated damages, the amount named
forms, in general, the measure of damages in case of a breach, and the recovery must be
for that amount. No other or greater damages can be awarded, even though the actual
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actually suffered, judged by the difference between the market price and the
contract price, approximated $6,000. Viewed in a larger context, the decision
is even more detrimental. As long as Campbell maintains its present contract,
it will not be able to use the judicial weapons of injunction and specific perform-
ance to police the many contracts it enters into with farmers. It will have no
means of forestalling a farmer's revolt; the only recourse will be a suit for
damages against each farmer who breaches, a remedy markedly inadequate,
even in the absence of a liquidated damages provision. Since time is of the
essence due to the perishable nature of the subject matter, it may be impossible
to obtain a crop elsewhere at a reasonable price or within a reasonable market
area.8 ' And although it may be entitled~to consequential damages resulting
from an inability to fulfill its sales contracts,3 2 the problem of proof will be
exceedingly difficult. Moreover, if the consequential damages involved are
large, as they are quite likely to be in the case of an organization as big as
Campbell's, the likelihood is that the farmer will be judgment proof. 3
But the decision, while clearly a setback for Campbell, does not offer farm-
ers the blanket invitation to breach which might be inferred from the lower
court's view that these carrots, "judged by objective standards," were not
unique goods. 34 Such a narrow view of equitable relief would, seem to pre-
dude specific performance of any farmer-grower contract, regardless of the
fairness of its terms. But the circuit court preferred the view that the test
for specific performance "was not objective"; it was enough here that the
canner needed these goods to maintain the uniform appearance of its product.
This ruling, in effect, admonished farmers that they will be held to any reason-
able contracts they make, and threw a strong hint to canners that if they reform
their contracts so as to give the farmer a fair deal, they may in the future turn
to the courts for specific performance.
The Campbell case, therefore, illustrates one of the ways in which courts
loss may be greater or less." Grande v. Eagle Brewing Co., 44 R.I. 424, 427, 117 Atl.
640, 642 (1922), citing 8 R.C.L. § 127. And see 15 Am. JuR., Damages, § 264.
31. Most canning contracts call for delivery by the farmer of the crop to the can-
ner's factory. Any but large canners probably lack the field purchasing agents necessary
to buy crops in other localities. See Curtice Brothers' Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J.Eq. 831, 833,
66 Ad. 935, 936 (1907).
32. 5 WILLISTON, CoNmTAcrs § 1347 (rev. ed. 1937).
33. Furthermore, if the consequential damages are disproportionately large in view
of the profit to be made by the breaching party on the transaction, they will often be
disallowed by the court. Hooks Smelting Co. v. Planters' Compress Co., 72 Ark. 275,
79 S.W. 1052 (1904) (plaintiff denied recovery of consequential damages amounting to
over $5,000 due to delay in repairs of machinery, where the repairer anticipated a profit
of only $100-$200); Home v. Midland Ry. [1873] L.R. 8 C.P. 131. See McCormick,
Damages for Breach of Coniract, 19 MINN. L. REy. 497, 507-11 (1935).
But see UxnFORm REVISED SALms Act § 116(2) (a) which would allow the buyer
consequential damages for any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know.
34. 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1949). See further 5 WILLISTON, CONTRIACrS § 1419
(rev. ed. 1937).
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influence the terms of business contracts. There are definite limitations, how-
ever, on how far the judicial process can go in correcting the abuses arising
from mass standardized contracts.m5 Courts lack the business experience prop-
erly to reform these contracts as a whole. Mloreover, the technique of inter-
pretation and the doctrines of mutuality and consideration to which judges
must resort in the endeavor to attain an equitable result in the individual case,
are often clumsy instruments for implementing public policy.ao
In the final analysis, the solution to the problem of eliminating the oppres-
sive aspects of mass standardized contracts lies in curtailing the power of the
stronger bargaining party at the time of the contract's formation. In some
instances, principally in the field of fire insurance, legislatures have interceded
and written the contract for the parties.ar But in the farmer-canner situation,
since a smaller group of people is affected by the contracts, it might prove
difficult to goad a legislature into action. 3s And since statutory regulation is
relatively inflexible, it is not well suited to handle the many varied situations
35. "Attempts to revise the more basic unequal distribution of coercive power among
individuals which is registered in normal market prices themselves, would require reme-
dies which courts alone would be incapable of furnishing, and inquiries for which they
are not fitted." Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COL. L. REy. C03,
625 (1943).
S6. The proposed Uniform Revised Sales Act should stock the court's arsenal vith
several effective weapons. In the first place, the Act consistently distinguishes between
the merchant (or professional) and those who have no special kmowledge of commercial
usage. In the farmer-canner situation, the small farmer would probably be considered a
merchant with respect to such sections as those relating to Warranty of merchantability
(URSA § 38) since he should have sufficient knowledge and experience to pack and
label his goods properly. But with respect to other provisions of the Act, when the
practice in question goes beyond his limited experience, he will not be held to the stringent
standards required of merchants.
Of particular importance is URSA § 23, which would allow a court to refuse to en-
force a contract which it finds unconscionable or to strike any unconscionable clause and
enforce the rest of the contract. Furthermore, the court would be permitted to substitute
for any stricken clause such provision as would be implied under the Act if that clause
never existed. For example, if the court found that the agreement was too harsh in
respect to the time for delivery, a "reasonable time" for such performance would b.
substituted.
37. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 168. The New York standard fire insurance form
has been adopted by forty-one states. PATrERSox, CASES ON Ii.su=AcE 763 (1947).
38. This is not to deny the proven effectiveness of farm groups as lobbyists. For
succinct descriptions of farm organizations and their power, particularly on the national
scene, see Griswold, FA.MInXG AND Dmociuc 126 ct seq. (1948); Wing, Trends in
National Farm Organizations, U.S. DEPr. oF AG. Yr-nooic 941 (1940) ; McCune, Tim
FAum BLoc (1943).
Wisconsin is one of the few states which has any statutory regulations of grower-
canner business relations. It requires the canner to furnish a financial statement to the
Department of Agriculture, and if it is considered unsatisfactory, the canner can be
required to provide a surety bond of sufficient size to insure the fulfillment of his con-
tracts with farmers. As an alternative to posting a bond, he may file with the Depart-
ment an agreement providing for the setting aside of a certain percentage of the proc-
essed produce in trust for the farmers. Wis. STAT. § 100.03 (1947).
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which occur within the trade.3 9 Two developments, however, offer promise
that the position of farmers and canners may eventually become equated.
First is the growth of farmer cooperatives. Implemented by the farmers'
collective strength, these groups have been successful in various parts of the
country in bargaining on the terms of contracts for such commodities as peas,
beans and peaches. 40  Moreover, in Mandeville Island Farms v. Amcrican
Crystal Sugar Co.41 the Supreme Court opened the way for another
means of protecting the farmer-Sherman Act prosecutions of large produce
buyers who take advantage of market control to fix contract prices and con-
tract terms.42
These developments have helped to equalize bargaining power in
contract negotiations. But where litigation develops as a result of a contract
which clearly reflects the superior strength of one of the parties, courts must
continue to play an important role if the weaker side is to be protected. The
Campbell case is a refreshing departure from the more usual judicial technique
of misconstruing the plain words of the contract to reach a desired result.43
39. Note the following caveat by Prausnitz: "[Legislation] has a serious disadvan-
tage. It does away with the flexibility without which only very few trades can do. It
enlarges the businessman's risk and does not allow him to take measures against its in-
crease, measures which only he can devise and which must be applied rapidly. Legis-
lative compulsion works best where a trade has grown into a quasi-governmental func-
tion, as, e.g., insurance or traffic; it is almost impossible in all other branches." PRAus-
Nrrz, op. cit. supra note 1, at 145.
40. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE Co sMrssIoN ON AGRICULTURAL INCOME INQUIRYt
PART II, 889 (1937). See SHEPHERD, op. cit. supra note 17, at 356 ct seq.; SuaEnn,
AGRICULTURAL PaxcE CONTROL 236 et seq. (1945).
41. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
42. In the Mandeville case the farmer was presented with a standardized contract
giving the processor rights of supervision over planting and growing and the right to
reject beets if they were "not suitable in [the refiner's] judgment for the manufacture
of sugar." Id. at 222-3. There were only three sugar refiners in the area and the last
vestige of price competition in the purchase of beets was eliminated when they beganl
computing price on the basis of the avertage net returns of all three, instead of the sep-
arate net returns. Id. at 223. The court found that the "farmers' only alternative to
dealing with one of the three refiners [was] to stop growing beets." Id. at 240. Follow-
ing the doctrine of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the court held that even
though these transactions were intrastate, they affected interstate commerce and were
subject to federal laws. The broad implications of this and other recent anti-trust de-
cisions are that concentrations of power which create leverage on either the buying or
selling side of the market violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 800-1 (1946) (illegal buying power in the purchase
of tobacco leaf) ; see also Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Pur-
pose? 43 ILL. L. REv. 745 (1949).
43. In this respect the decision is paralleled by the concurring opinion of Judge Clark
in Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1947). "I
agree that the course of negotiations required and controlled by the insurance company
was 'unpardonable,' and am willing to concur in the decision for that reason." (Appli-
cant for life insurance had indicated that he wished policy to take effect upon successful
completion of "Part B," a medical examination. He passed the exam and paid the first
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